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Abstract
Price promotions induce consumers to purchase higher-than-usual quantities,
resulting in higher stocks that lead to increased consumption. We show for a stylized
model with a single shop and a single loyal customer that because of this stockpiling
effect, promotions can be profitable even if they do not attract extra customers.
1 Introduction
Researchers have spent several decades on investigating the effects of price promotions.
Blattberg, Briesch and Fox (1995) review the marketing literature on a number of issues
concerning price, and more general, sales promotions. As they report, some claims have
been consistent and supported with empirical results, for instance that promotions result
in a significant temporal and cross-sectional shifting of category demand. But for other
important issues, few and conflicting results have been obtained. One of the unresolved
key issues mentioned by Blattberg, Briesch and Fox (1995) is the effect of promotions
on consumption through increased stocks that result from customers purchasing higher-
than-usual quantities or accelerating their purchase occasion. In the last decade, it has
been shown using experimental research (Chandon and Wansink 2002; Folkes, Martin
and Gupta 1993; Wansink and Deshpande 1994) and econometric modelling (Ailawadi
and Neslin 1998; Bell, Iyer and Padmanabhan 2002) that higher stocks indeed lead to
increased consumption.
Why does this stockpiling effect occur? The main reason stated in the literature is that
higher stocks reduce the concern about having to replace the product (Ailawadi and Neslin
1998; Assunc¸a˜o and Meyer 1993; Bell, Chiang and Padmanabhan 1999; Hoch, Dre`ze and
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Purk 1994), leading to a higher consumption rate. It has further been shown that the
flexibility of the consumption rate differs across product categories. Another reason why
higher stocks can lead to increased consumption, is that consumers face less stockouts
and therefore have more opportunity to consume the product (Ailawadi and Neslin 1998).
If higher stocks indeed lead to increased consumption, then that effect should be taken
into consideration when a firm chooses a retail format. The “everyday low price” (EDLP)
format, which has recently received a lot of attention (Ailawadi, Lehmann and Neslin
2001; Bell and Lattin 1998; Hoch, Dre`ze and Purk 1994), does not benefit from the
stockpiling effect, at least not in its pure form where the retailer charges a constant, low
everyday price with no temporary price discounts. The alternative “high low” (Hi-Lo)
retail format, which charges higher prices on an everyday basis but runs frequent price
promotions in which the prices are below the EDLP level, does benefit. Of course, the
EDLP retail format may be preferred for different reasons, such as restoring consumer
credibility in retail pricing (Ortmeyer, Quelch and Salmon 1991) or lowering operating
costs (Hoch, Dre`ze and Purk 1994). But the inability to benefit from the stockpiling effect
may help explain why, in practice, most retailers have not adopted EDLP, and why those
that claim to have adopted EDLP still use (occasional) price promotions (Hoch, Dre`ze
and Purk 1994).
In this article we examine the effects of stockpiling on consumption and show that
a retail format with price promotions can lead to higher profits than a constant pricing
strategy, even if price promotions do not build more store traffic. The model developed
by Bell, Iyer and Padmanabhan (2002) is the starting-point of this study. The authors
develop a game theoretical model of price competition between shops in response to the
stockpiling and subsequent consumption dynamics of consumers. The model is explained
thoroughly in Section 2. It is based on a two-period planning horizon. The purchase and
consumption behavior of consumers is as follows. A consumer can purchase either one
or two units in the first period. Though he ‘plans’ to consume only one unit in the first
period, price uncertainty can make him decide to purchase an additional unit and store
it for consumption in the second period. But there is a probability that the additionally
purchased unit is also consumed in the first period, and the consumer is aware of this
stockpiling effect. The model makes use of several assumptions, one being that shops
charge the same price in both periods. So, in a strict sense, Hi-Lo price strategies are
not considered. However, shops can apply a randomized strategy, where the price that is
charged is the outcome of a random choice between a high price and a low price. Bell, Iyer
and Padmanabhan (2002) show that there are cases (i.e. parameter settings) for which
the profit maximizing equilibrium solution is such that each shop applies a randomized
price strategy rather than a constant price strategy. As we will point out in Section
2, however, the assumption that shops charge the same price in both periods leads to
suboptimal strategies. Moreover, if that assumption is relaxed, then profit maximizing
equilibrium solutions where shops apply a randomized price strategy no longer exist.
The model we propose is inspired by Bell, Iyer and Padmanabhan (2002) and uses
the same purchase/consumption dynamics. But it differs on some key aspects. Several
assumptions are relaxed: a firm does not have to charge the same price in each period;
marginal consumption utility does not have to be constant. We consider a single shop,
and hence there are no game theoretical elements. We consider a single loyal consumer,
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so that store traffic does not play a role. We study a long run planning horizon. The
goal is to show that there are cases where Hi-Lo pricing is more profitable than charging
a constant price.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows: The next section presents the
model developed by Bell, Iyer and Padmanabhan (2002), summarizes their analysis and
results, and provides some points of critique. We then describe our model in detail,
determine the optimal pricing strategy, and present some examples of cases where Hi-Lo
pricing is more profitable than charging a constant price. We conclude the article with a
summary of the results and with directions for further research.
2 Bell, Iyer and Padmanabhan (2002): model, re-
sults, and critique
In this section, we present the model of Bell, Iyer and Padmanabhan (2002), summarize
their analysis and results, and provide points of critique.
MODEL
A single type of product is considered, which is sold by n shops and for which there
are T homogeneous consumers. Both shops and consumers have a two-period planning
horizon, where a period can be interpreted as a time interval between two shopping trips.
Consumers shop randomly, i.e. may purchase in each shop with equal probability 1/n on
a shopping trip. Each consumer starts with zero stock at the beginning of period 1.
The consumption strategy of a consumer is independent of prices at which stocked
products were purchased and independent of expectations about future prices. If two
products are in stock at the beginning of a period, then at least one product is consumed
and there is a probability θ that the second product is consumed. If there is one product
in stock at the beginning of a period, then that product is consumed.
A consumer shops in a period if the stock at the beginning of that period is zero.
The purchase behavior of a consumer is rational. His objective is to maximize the total
expected utility over the two-period planning horizon. The utility in a period is equal to
the value of the consumed products (u per product, measured in monetary units) minus
the purchase cost (selling price per product) and holding cost (h per product that is in
stock at the end of a period). Bell et al. remark that it is easy to also include a transaction
cost per shopping trip. It is assumed that a consumer purchases at most two products in
period 1 and at most one product in period 2.
The objective of a shop is to maximize the total profit over the planning horizon. Since
purchase costs for a shop are ignored (they could easily be included, but that would not
lead to additional insights), this is equivalent to maximizing total revenue. Clearly, a shop
should not charge a price higher than u, since consumers will not purchase any products
and hence no profit will be made. Moreover, it only makes sense to charge a price lower
than u if that will make consumers purchase two products instead of one. Therefore, a
shop should either charge the high price ph = u or the low price pl, which is the price
at which consumers are indifferent between purchasing one or two products. The exact
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value of pl will be determined in the mathematical analysis below.
It is assumed that a shop charges the same price in both periods. So, actually, Hi-
Lo strategies are not considered. However, a shop may apply a randomized strategy to
determine the price, by choosing either the high price or the low price with certain positive
probabilities. Alternatively, a shop may apply either a fixed strategy and charge the high
price or the low price with probability 1.
An equilibrium is defined as a set of (fixed or randomized) strategies for each shop,
where no shop can increase its expected profit by unilaterally altering its strategy. A
symmetric equilibrium is an equilibrium where all shops apply the same strategy. Since
all shops are identical, a symmetric equilibrium is sought. By λ, 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, is denoted
the probability that a shop sets the high price.
MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
First, a condition for pl is derived based on the fact that consumers are indifferent between
purchasing one or two products in the first period when that price is charged. The
expected utility over both periods of purchasing one product in the first period is (using
ph = u)
E1 = 2u− pl − (λph + (1− λ)pl))
= u− pl + (1− λ)(u− pl)
and the expected utility over both periods of purchasing two products in the first period
is
E2 = θ(3u− 2pl − (λph + (1− λ)pl)) + (1− θ)(2u− 2pl − h)
= 2u− 2pl − (1− θ)h+ θ(1− λ)(u− pl).
The consumer is indifferent between purchasing one or two products if E1 = E2, which
gives
(λ+ (1− λ)θ)(u− pl) = (1− θ)h. (1)
Next, a second equilibrium condition for pl is derived. Since each consumer starts
with zero stock, all T consumers shop in period 1. An expected fraction λ + (1− λ)θ of
consumers will return in period 2, since they consumed all (1 or 2) products purchased
in the first period. Therefore, the total revenue for a shop that sets the high price ph = u
is (recall that a consumer purchases in each shop with equal probability 1/n)
Rh =
(
T
n
+ (λ+ (1− λ)θ)T
n
)
u
and the total revenue for a shop that sets the low price pl is
Rl =
(
2
T
n
+ (λ+ (1− λ)θ)T
n
)
pl.
In equilibrium, it should hold that
Rh = Rl,
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which can be rewritten as
(1 + λ+ (1− λ)θ)u = (2 + λ+ (1− λ)θ) pl. (2)
Combining (1) and (2) gives
pl =
u+ h(1− θ)
2
.
Given this low price, it is straightforward to determine the value λ∗ for λ that max-
imizes total profit for a shop. Bell et al. show that, under a certain condition on the
model parameters, 0 < λ∗ < 1, implying that a randomized strategy is optimal.
CRITIQUE
There are several unrealistic assumptions concerning consumer behavior in the model of
Bell et al. All consumers are assumed to shop randomly, whereas many consumers have
one or more favorite shops in practice. There is no decreasing marginal utility, since
consuming a second product in a certain period brings the same utility as consuming the
first product. However, these assumptions are acceptable since the objective of the model
is not to approach a realistic setting, but to show that price promotions can be profitable
in situations where stockpiling leads to increased consumption.
Our main critique concerns the restriction to strategies with constant prices over the
planning horizon of two periods. This implies that if a shop charges the low price in the
first period, it also has to charge the low price in the second period. But since shoppers
never purchase two products in the second period, it is always better to charge the high
price in that period. Therefore, all randomized (but with constant prices) strategies with
0 ≤ λ < 1 are sub-optimal. Therefore, it is better to consider the following strategies for
a shop: charge the high price with probability λ, 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, in period 1; always charge
the high price in period 2. But, as we will show below, an equilibrium for this class of
strategies with 0 < λ < 1 can never maximize profit.
So, we focus on the above mentioned modified strategies which always charge the high
price in the second period. The total revenues then become
Rh =
T
n
(u+ (λ+ (1− λ)θ)u)
for a shop that charges ph = u in period 1, and
Rl =
T
n
(2pl + (λ+ (1− λ)θ)u)
for a shop that charges pl in period 1.
The equilibrium condition Rh = Rl now gives pl = u/2. But it is obvious that selling
two products for half the price in period 1 can never be profitable, since that will leave
the profit in period 1 unchanged, but reduce the number of shoppers and hence the profit
in period 2. So equilibria with randomized strategies never maximize profit.
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3 Model with one shop and one loyal consumer
The objective of our model is not to give an accurate description of reality. The goal
is to show that in situations where stockpiling leads to increased consumption, high-low
pricing can be more profitable than charging a constant price, even if lower prices do not
attract more consumers.
The model is inspired by the one of Bell, Iyer and Padmanabhan (2002), but differs
from that model in the following key aspects. We consider a single shop and a single
loyal consumer, and study a long run planning horizon. The utility of consuming a
second product in a period may be less than that for the first product, i.e., there can be
decreasing marginal utility. Both the shop and the consumer have an infinite period (long
run) planning horizon, where a period can be interpreted as a time interval between two
shopping trips.
The consumption strategy is independent of prices at which stocked products were
purchased and independent of expectations about future prices. If two products are in
stock at the beginning of a period, then at least one product is consumed and there is a
probability θ that a second product is consumed. If there is one product in stock at the
beginning of a period, then that product is consumed.
The purchase behavior of the consumer is rational. His objective is to maximize the
expected utility per period. The utility in a period is equal to the value of the consumed
products (u1 for the first product and u2 ≤ u1 for the second product, measured in
monetary units) minus the purchase cost (selling price per product) and holding cost (h
per product that is in stock at the end of a period). The consumer only shops in a period if
there is no stock left at the end of the previous period, and purchases at most 2 products.
The objective of the shop is to maximize the expected total profit per period. Since
purchase costs for the shop are ignored (they could easily be included, but that would
not lead to additional insights), this is equivalent to maximizing total revenue. Clearly,
a shop should not charge a price higher than u1, since consumers will not purchase any
products and hence no profit will be made. Moreover, it only makes sense to charge a
price lower than u1 if that will make consumers purchase two products instead of one. So,
a shop should either charge the high price ph = u1 or the low price pl at which consumers
switch strategies, i.e., at which consumers are indifferent between purchasing one or two
products. An expression for pl will be determined in the next section. The probability
that the shop charges the high price u1 is denoted by λ, 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. Note that the shop
uses constant pricing if λ = 0 (low price) or λ = 1 (high price), and Hi-Lo pricing if
0 < λ < 1.
4 Analysis
We first determine an expression for pl based on the indifference of the customer at that
price between purchasing one or two products. Let E1 denote the long-run expected utility
per period if the consumer always purchases one product. Let E2 denote the long-run
expected utility per period if the consumer purchases two products when pl is charged
and one product when ph = u1 is charged.
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It is easy to see (using ph = u1) that
E1 = λ(u1 − ph) + (1− λ)(u1 − pl)
= (1− λ)(u1 − pl).
In order to determine E2, we first need to calculate the probability that the consumer
shops in an arbitrary period, assuming that two products are purchased when the price is
low. If the consumer shops in a certain period, then there is a probability (1− λ)(1− θ)
that he will not shop in the next period. So the average time between two successive
shopping trips is 1 + (1− λ)(1− θ) periods, and hence the probability that the consumer
shops in a period is
Pr2 :=
1
1 + (1− λ)(1− θ) .
Consequently, the probability that a consumer shops and that the high price is charged is
Pr2,h :=
λ
1 + (1− λ)(1− θ) ,
and the probability that a consumer shops and that the low price is charged is
Pr2,l :=
1− λ
1 + (1− λ)(1− θ) .
If a consumer shops and the high price is charged, then one product is purchased. That
product is consumed in the same period and the corresponding utility is
E2,h := ph − u1.
If a consumer shops and the low price is charged, then two products are purchased. With
probability θ, both products are consumed in that period giving total utility u1+u2−2pl.
With probability 1 − θ, one of the products is stocked and consumed in the next period
giving total utility 2u1 − 2pl − h. So, the expected utility corresponding with a low price
shopping trip is
E2,l := θ(u1 + u2 − 2pl) + (1− θ)(2u1 − 2pl − h).
We therefore get (using ph = u1)
E2 = E2,hPr2,h + E2,lPr2,l
= (1− λ)(2− θ)u1 + θu2 − 2pl − (1− θ)h
1 + (1− λ)(1− θ) .
The consumer is indifferent between purchasing one or two products for price pl if
E1 = E2, which gives
(1− λ)(u1 − pl) = (1− λ)(2− θ)u1 + θu2 − 2pl − (1− θ)h
1 + (1− λ)(1− θ) .
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This can be rewritten as
pl = u1 − θ(u1 − u2) + (1− θ)h
1− (1− λ)(1− θ) . (3)
Note from (3) that pl is increasing in λ. So if the reduced price is charged more
frequently, then a larger reduction is needed to make the consumer stockpile. This finding
is in accordance with prior research on the relationship between promotional frequency and
promotional response (Ailawadi, Lehmann and Neslin 2001; Assunc¸a˜o and Meyer 1993;
Blattberg, Briesch and Fox 1995; Teunter 2002). It leads to the important managerial
insight that price discounts should not be offered too frequently, since that reduces the
incentive for the consumer to stockpile the product.
Using (3), it follows that the expected profit per period for the shop is
EP = phPr2,h + 2plPr2,l
=
λu1 + (1− λ)2
(
u1 − θ(u1−u2)+(1−θ)h1−(1−λ)(1−θ)
)
1 + (1− λ)(1− θ) .
By setting the derivative of EP with respect to λ to 0 and checking that the second
derivative is negative, it is possible to derive a closed-form expression for the optimal
value of λ and conditions for which it is between 0 and 1. However, there are two reasons
for not presenting that expression and conditions here. First, they are very complex and
not insightful. Second, they would have no direct practical use, since our model with a
single customer that purchases at most two products is rather unrealistic.
Indeed, recall that the model was only designed to show that in situations where
stockpiling leads to increased consumption, high-low pricing can be more profitable that
charging a fixed price even if lower prices do not attract more consumers. In modelling
terms: there are values of u1, u2, θ, and h for which the value of λ that maximizes EP
is between 0 and 1. In the next section, we present some examples for which this indeed
holds. For completeness, we also present examples for which the optimal value for λ is
either 0 or 1.
5 Examples
Table 1 shows the low price and the associated profits for λ = 0, 0.1, 0.2, . . . , 1 for four
different examples. These examples are selected in order to show that both constant and
Hi-Lo strategies can be optimal. For all examples, u1 is set to 1 and can be interpreted
as the unit of measurement for money/utility.
INSERT TABLE 1
First consider Example 1. If a constant high price ph = u1 = 1 is charged (λ = 1),
then the profit is 1 in each period. The maximum constant price at which the consumer
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purchases two products is 0.75, which also leads to an expected profit per period of 1.
But Hi-Lo strategies have the advantage that two products can be sold at a price higher
than 0.75. In fact, as was proven in Section 4 and can be observed from Table 1, the
lowest price pl at which two units can be sold increases with the probability λ that the
high price is charged. As Table 1 shows, the optimal value for λ is between 0.4 and 0.5
(0.46 to be exact) and the associated expected profit per period is 1.07.
For Example 2, similar arguments can be used to explain why a Hi-Lo strategy is
optimal. Compared to Example 1, the value of pl is lower for all values of λ, because the
utility u2 of consuming a second product is lower and the stocking cost is larger. But
since the probability θ of directly consuming a second purchased product is large, offering
price discounts can still be profitable. The optimal strategy is to charge the discount price
0.61 with probability 0.44. The profit for this optimal Hi-Lo strategy is 1.04, whereas the
profit for applying the constant high or low price are 1 and 1.01, respectively.
Example 3 resembles Example 2 in that the stocking cost h is large and the utility
u2 of consuming a second product is small. So, again, a large discount is needed to sell
two products. But the probability θ that selling two products increases consumption is
much smaller, so that price discounts are no longer profitable. The optimal strategy is to
always charge the high price.
Example 4 is the opposite from Example 3 with h small, u2 large, and θ large. A
small discount is sufficient to sell a second product, and the optimal strategy is to always
charge the low price.
6 Conclusion
We analyzed a model with a single shop and a single loyal, utility maximizing customer.
The customer normally purchases and consumes one unit of a product in each period.
But a price promotion can induce the customer to purchase a second unit. That second
unit is meant to be stored for the next period, but there is a probability that both units
may be consumed in the same period once they are in stock. The consumer is aware of
this stockpiling effect, but purchasing two products still maximizes his utility if the price
cut is deep enough. It was shown that a deeper price cut is needed if promotions are more
frequent, which supports the validity of the model. Aside from promotional frequency,
the necessary price cut is also determined by other factors: the utility of consuming a
second unit, the cost of holding a unit in stock, and the probability that a second stored
unit is consumed. It was shown that for certain settings of these factors, price promotions
can increase the shop’s profit. So, because of the stockpiling effect, price promotions can
increase the profit earned from the single loyal customer.
The more general implication of this result is that price promotions can increase profit,
even if they do not attract extra customers. Therefore, the stockpiling effect should be
considered in the analysis of price promotions, e.g. when comparing Hi-Lo and EDLP
strategies. Future research should be directed towards finding the best way to incorporate
the stockpiling effect in promotional models. The empirical testing of several inventory-
consumption (rate) functions is very challenging, extending the work of Ailawadi and
Neslin (1998). An indirect but perhaps more practical avenue for future research would
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be to investigate to which degree EDLP shoppers indeed exhibit less stockpiling effects
than Hi-Lo shoppers.
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Example 1 Example 2 Example 3 Example 4
u1 = 1 u1 = 1 u1 = 1 u1 = 1
u2 = 0.8 u2 = 0.6 u2 = 0.7 u2 = 0.9
θ = 0.5 θ = 0.85 θ = 0.4 θ = 0.6
h = 0.05 h = 0.1 h = 0.2 h = 0.05
λ pl EP pl EP pl EP pl EP
0.0 0.75 1.00 0.58 1.01 0.40 0.50 0.87 1.24
0.1 0.77 1.03 0.59 1.02 0.48 0.62 0.88 1.23
0.2 0.79 1.05 0.60 1.03 0.54 0.72 0.88 1.22
0.3 0.81 1.06 0.60 1.04 0.59 0.79 0.89 1.21
0.4 0.82 1.07 0.61 1.04 0.63 0.85 0.89 1.19
0.5 0.83 1.07 0.62 1.04 0.66 0.89 0.90 1.17
0.6 0.84 1.06 0.62 1.04 0.68 0.93 0.90 1.14
0.7 0.85 1.05 0.63 1.03 0.71 0.95 0.91 1.11
0.8 0.86 1.04 0.63 1.02 0.73 0.97 0.91 1.08
0.9 0.87 1.02 0.64 1.01 0.74 0.99 0.92 1.04
1.0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Table 1
Expected profit per period for λ = 0.0, 0.1, 0.2, . . . , 1 for 4 examples.
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